

# Pre-meeting Persuasion of Two Committee Members through Selective Disclosure of Two Types of Evidences

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## Abstract

We investigate how the proponent of a plan should persuade the two members of a committee at the pre-meeting briefing. The value of the plan is determined by its two components and the committee members have difference preferences over them. The proponent has a verifiable evidence for the realized value of each component. He can brief either only one member or both members separately and, at the briefing, can disclose either only one evidence or both. When the preferences of the two members are not similar, it is shown that the proponent should brief each of the two members before the meeting and should reveal only the evidence that a member is less interested in. This explains the benefit of having separate briefings of multiple members prior to the meeting.

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